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Abstract: We review a large number of empirical studies on Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) 
pricing. We distinguish between laboratory experiments, field experiments, survey 
experiments and case studies. Based on this survey we identify the following two gaps in the 
recently flourishing literature on PWYW pricing: (1) studies on PWYW pricing for goods 
with high cost, and (2) studies on the long-term effects of PWYW pricing. 
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1. Introduction 
Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) is a participative pricing mechanism (Chandran and Morwitz 
2005, Natter and Kaufmann 2015), which leaves the pricing decision with the buyer. In 
contrast to other participative pricing mechanisms, like name-your-own-price (NYOP, see 
Spann, Skiera and Schäfers 2004, Spann and Tellis 2006), a buyer can choose any price 
(including zero) and the seller has to accept this price. 
PWYW can be considered as a special form of voluntary market payments, which have been 
discussed before (e.g., the literature on tipping, Azar 2004, 2007). What distinguishes PWYW 
from other forms of voluntary market payments is that PWYW is used for goods and services, 
which are usually sold employing fixed prices (e.g., music, restaurant meals, drinks, 
entertainment activities), and that the sellers who use PWYW compete with sellers who use 
fixed pricing. 
PWYW pricing has recently received considerable attention in the management, business, and 
economics literature. In fact, one of the first articles on PWYW pricing (Kim, Natter and 
Spann 2010) is the one downloaded most frequently from this journal’s website. There have 
been a considerable number of empirical studies on PWYW pricing, and in this paper, we 
present a survey of empirical studies on PWYW pricing published between 2009 and 2015. In 
particular, we review all empirical studies on PWYW pricing which report data generated in 
laboratory experiments, field experiments, survey experiments and case studies. 
We find that (1) PWYW is used almost exclusively for low-cost goods, experience goods, and 
for bundles of goods and services, and that (2) almost all empirical studies focus on relatively 
short time periods. Based on our survey, we identify some unanswered questions and suggest 
directions for further research. 
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review the empirical literature on PWYW 
pricing and summarize our findings in four tables. In section 3 we identify topics which have 
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not been dealt with in detail but which are relevant for sellers if PWYW is put into practice. 
In section 4, we conclude. 
 
2. The Empirical Literature on PWYW Pricing 
2.1 Categorization of Empirical Studies 
The first paper on PWYW pricing, to our knowledge, is Kim, Natter and Spann (2009). Since 
this publication, the literature on PWYW has received lots of attention. In Tables 1 to 4 we 
summarize the results of all empirical studies on PWYW pricing between 2009 and July 2015 
available in various databases. To avoid publication bias, we include working papers. We 
decided to look at individual studies (case studies, experiments, etc.) instead of papers. This is 
because several papers report results from more than one study. We classify the empirical 
studies into four categories: laboratory experiments (LE), field experiments (FE), survey 
experiments (SE), and case studies (CS). In LE, FE and SE the researcher has full control 
over the design of the experiment and makes use of random assignment of individual subjects 
to one or more treatments. 
LE take place in an environment over which the researchers has complete control (a 
university’s laboratory). All LE on PWYW pricing are incentivized, i.e., the subject’s 
compensation depend on her choices. In all LE the subjects are students. 
FE are similar to LE, except that they are run in the field. An example is Kim, Kaufmann and 
Stegemann (2014), who have designed an intervention in the field and run their treatments at 
two comparable shopping malls. Hence, in FE in contrast to LE, the researcher has less 
control. A SE embeds the experimental design within a survey (e.g., a factorial survey or a 
survey based on vignettes). Usually, the survey consists of hypothetical purchase scenarios, 
and each subject responds to one or more scenarios. SE are easy to administer and, usually, 
they are internet-based. This allows the researcher to generate a large number of observations 
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within a short period of time. In contrast to LE and FE, in SE there is no strategic interaction 
between subjects and the researcher has no control once the experiment has started. 
Involvement might not be as emotionally intense as it is the case in LE and FE (Collett and 
Childs 2011), and, usually, there are no financial incentives linked to the subjects’ decisions. 
In most SE, the subjects are undergraduate students who complete the survey for partial or 
extra course credit. 
In a CS, there is no controlled intervention by the researcher since a CS is an observational 
study. While in FE, the researcher chooses the intervention (i.e., use of PWYW pricing), in 
CS the seller choose PWYW pricing and allows the researcher to use the data on sales, 
revenue, prices, etc. Self-selection is an issue because unsuccessful sellers are driven out of 
the market (see Kim, Natter and Spann 2010, 152) so that only sellers who use PWYW for 
short periods and sellers who use PWYW successfully over longer periods are observed. 
 
2.2 Main Results from our Survey 
Table 1 summarizes the LE. For each LE, we sketch the design and summarize the main 
findings. In one of the LE (Machado and Sinha 2013), real products were sold to students and 
the latter had to fill out a questionnaire regarding their payment motivations. We decided to 
categorize this experiment as LE because the context in which the purchase took place was 
controlled by the researchers. Although subjects can differ in their valuations for the products, 
this should not bias the results because subjects are randomly allocated to the different 
conditions. In the other four LE, subjects trade hypothetical goods, for which the value is 
induced (see Smith 1976), so that, in contrast to Machado and Sinha’s LE, students’ true 
valuations are controlled. The goal of these studies is not to identify the motives that drive 
payments. Rather, the goal is to investigate the effect of market structure (Krämer et al. 2015, 
Schmidt, Spann and Zeithammer 2014) and the strategic interaction between multiple buyers 
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and a seller (Mak et al. 2015). 
Table 2 summarizes the FE. For each FE, we present the experimental design, type of 
product, payments, duration of the PWYW intervention and the main findings. We use the 
following acronyms for referring to the types of products most frequently investigated: 
experience goods (EG), digital goods (DG) which always have quasi zero marginal cost, 
goods with low marginal cost (LMC). If not indicated otherwise, payments refer to mean 
PWYW payments. What sticks out is that in the FE, PWYW is applied to low-value items and 
over short periods of time. The highest PWYW payments are payments for a day at a golf 
resort ($22.95, Machado and Sinha 2013), and payments for a photo portrait (€16.12 ≈ 
$17.40, Kim, Natter and Spann 2014). In all other FE, average PWYW payments are below 
$10, and in many cases they are even lower than one dollar. 
Gautier and van der Klaauw (2012) provide interesting results because they find evidence for 
self-selection. Guests, who booked a hotel stay under PWYW pricing in advance, pay 
significantly less in comparison to hotel guests, who have booked the hotel stay at regular 
conditions, but whom are given the chance to PWYW. A convincing interpretation is that 
PWYW campaigns of hotels attract buyers who have little concerns to pay small amounts of 
money. However, Gautier and van der Klaauw (2012) also report that while the campaign is 
successful in the sense of increasing capacity utilization for unfavorable days, PWYW is not a 
feasible long-term strategy as the share of those guests who have little concern to pay 
anything may increase. 
Most FE last only for a couple of days. Schons et al. (2013) and Gravert (2014) stick out 
because they analyze repeated purchases. In Schons et al. (2013), buyers’ repeated purchases 
are observed over 8 weeks, and it is found that, at the individual level, prices decrease over 
time. Similarly, Gravert (2014) finds that payments decrease from the first to the second 
purchase. 
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Table 3 summarizes the SE. For each SE, we summarize data on payments, type of product, 
experimental design and main findings. In comparison with the FE, it becomes apparent that 
in SE, PWYW payments for higher-value products are also analyzed. The most expensive 
product is a mobile phone, with estimated production cost of $472 (according to subjects’ 
estimations). 
It should be noted that most SE are based on hypothetical decisions, which might result in 
subjects overstating the prices they would pay (Harrison and Rutström 2008, Murphy et al. 
2005). Such a hypothetical bias might not be a problem if one only looks at treatment 
differences to see whether a specific variable (like the availability of a suggested price, for 
example) affects prices that subjects are willing to pay. Exceptions are studies 3 and 4 in 
Kunter (2015), where subjects are surveyed after they have made a real PWYW purchase. 
Most SE identify variables that influence PWYW payments. Variables that positively affect 
payments are fairness, buyers’ satisfaction (product quality, service quality), social norms, 
information about prices paid by other buyers and information about cost. Variables that 
negatively affect payments are social distance and anonymity. The effect of external reference 
prices is ambiguous and seems to depend on whether the reference price is perceived as 
reasonable or too high. 
Another pattern that emerges from Table 3 concerns the types of products. Many products are 
experience goods, like tickets for sauna, cinema, concert, zoo or museum, or drinks or meals 
at restaurants, where quality is known only after consuming the product. In line with this is 
study 1 in Machado and Sinha (2013) in which subjects pay what they want for a dinner in an 
upscale restaurant. Subjects buy a bundle consisting of (at least) the dinner and the quality of 
service. Both parts of the bundle are experience goods, and it is found that the quality of the 
service has the largest effect on payments. 
Table 4 summarizes the CS. For each CS, we summarize data on payments, type of product, 
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duration and main findings. All products investigated are experience goods, and some of them 
are digital goods (e.g., e-books and music) with almost zero marginal cost. There are three CS 
which report payments over longer time horizons: The e-book seller in Krawczyk, Kukla-
Gryz and Tyrowicz (2015), the seller of music downloads in Regner and Barria (2009), and 
the restaurant in Riener and Traxler (2012) report results from environments where PWYW 
has been used for 18 months or more. 
The study by León, Noguera and Tena-Sánchez (2012) stands out because in this study 
holiday packages with regular prices between $40 and $2,938 are offered under PWYW 
pricing. León, Noguera, and Tena-Sánchez (2012) show that holiday packages with a market 
value of more than €137,000 earned slightly more than €7,000 under PWYW pricing. For the 
seller, the use of PWYW was everything but a success because 46.5% of buyers paid nothing, 
and only 3.3% paid more than 40% of the regular price. Based on the comments in the seller’s 
blog, the authors argue that buyers chose low prices because they perceived reference prices 
as too high, and because they thought that marginal costs were low. Also, cannibalizing 
effects might be at work: For example, if subjects buy one part of a bundle (e.g., a flight) 
under PWYW and buy another part (e.g., dinner) at regular pricing, but have to pay the flight 
after they have paid the dinner, they might pay less because their budget for the bundle is 
already depleted. 
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Table 1: Laboratory Experiments (LE) 
 Reference Experimental Design Main Findings 
1 Krämer et al. 
(2015) 
subjects’ risk aversions and social preferences were measured; several 
treatments in which sellers with various pricing mechanisms competed, 
focus on sellers’ choices of pricing mechanism, resulting market 
structure, prices and profits 
compared to name-your-own-price (NYOP), PWYW achieves higher 
market penetration but lower profit; sellers choose PWYW if costs are 
low; PWYW prices depend on buyers social preferences 
2 Machado and 
Sinha (2013) 
(Study 2) 
subjects were told to watch and evaluate a movie, before that they 
could buy a snack; contextual factors (seller type, payment time, 
payment appeal, payment visibility) were varied 
average payments were $0.30, 60% paid nothing, possibly because 
subjects felt entitled to consume the snack for free; buyers paid more for 
local products if payment is made after the snack is consumed, buyers 
paid more if buyers were satisfied with quality, no evidence for image 
concerns 
3 Mak et al. (2015) 
(Experiment 1) 
PWYW as a threshold public good game; seller was simulated; an 
infinitely repeated game; 8 buyers with high or low valuation; if 
revenue falls below a known threshold the seller switches from PWYW 
to fixed pricing; market information was provided (i.e., buyers' 
valuations were common knowledge); each period buyers chose prices; 
full feedback (i.e., after each period buyers are informed about other 
buyers' prices and the earnings from previous period); treatments 
different by framing and by communication (no communication, 
suggested payments, chat) 
no effect of framing, average number of periods was around 190, mean 
number of periods for which PWYW was sustained is 10.50 (no 
communication), 35.88 (suggestion) and 167.50 (chat); results are driven 
by buyers with high valuations for the good; these buyers pay 
significantly more in chat-treatment; in chat-treatment subjects often 
coordinate on prices resulting in equal earnings 
4 Mak et al. (2015) 
(Experiment 2) 
similar to experiment 1 but all treatments with chat, with or without 
market information and with or without full feedback 
the possibility to communicate via chat facilitates the sustainability of 
PWYW pricing even if buyers have less than full information about 
other buyers' valuations and prices paid by other buyers; chat helps to 
establish a "social contract" about appropriate prices 
5 Schmidt et al. 
(2014) 
effect of competition is analyzed in two sets of treatments: (i) no 
competition treatments: repeated game with 1 seller and 3 buyers, 
seller chooses whether to enter the market or not, seller could invest in 
quality; (ii) competition treatments: 2 sellers and 6 buyers 
buyers are motivated by outcome-based social preferences and strategic 
concerns (keeping the seller in the market); no evidence for intention-
based social preferences; with competition prices are lower; sellers who 
invest in quality made positive profits on average in all treatments 
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Table 2: Field Experiments (FE) 
 Reference Experimental Design Product Type Payments Duration Main Finding 
1 Gautier and 
van der 
Klaauw 
(2012) 
hotel stays are sold via a 
promotional campaign in 36 
hotels 
EG, LMC involuntary participants: €48 
voluntary participants: €24 
regular prices are €80, €120, or 
€150 
2 days promotional campaigns with PWYW 
attracts customers with few pro-
social reputational concerns 
2 Gneezy et 
al. (2010) 
photos in amusement park are 
sold under fixed price or 
PWYW, in two out of four 
treatments half the revenue is 
donated to charity 
LMC merchandise revenue per individual 
p=$12.95: $0.40 
p=$12.95 + charity: $0.40 
PWYW: $0.42 
PWYW + charity: $0.45 
2 days per treatment merchandise revenue per individual 
is highest when part of the PWYW 
price is donated to charity 
3 Gneezy et 
al. (2012) 
in three treatments subjects 
could buy photos in amusement 
park at different fixed prices 
($5 or $15) or under PWYW 
pricing 
LMC ratio of individuals who bought 
product / average profit 
p=$15: 23% / $3.45 
p=$5: 64% / $3.20 
PWYW: 55% / $3.50 
boat tour: data from 
20 cruises per 
treatment 
in PWYW fewer individuals buy 
compared with $5; this opting-out 
is driven by image-concerns (not 
knowing the appropriate price) 
4 Gravert 
(2014) 
books at charitable bookstore 
are sold under PWYW, two 
treatments depend on whether 
subjects are reminded of their 
membership status 
EG, LMC $1.50 (pooled over treatments) 2 months members of the bookstore paid 75 
cents more when reminded of their 
membership; members pay less 
when they purchase a second book 
5 Jang and 
Chu (2012) 
(Study 5) 
subjects buy canned coffee, 
information about cost and 
reference price (i.e., prices paid 
by previous buyers) are 
provided 
EG, LMC $0.37 information about cost 
$0.42 reference price > cost 
$0.30 reference price = 0 
3 days on average, buyers paid less when 
informed that 72% of previous 
buyers paid nothing 
6 Kim, 
Kaufmann 
and 
Stegemann 
(2014) 
(Field Exp. 
1) 
restaurant meals in high-priced 
restaurant (drinks excluded) 
were sold, external reference 
price (i.e., information about 
regular price) and social 
distance regarding payment 
(personal interaction with 
waiter or anonymity) were 
varied 
EG, LMC €4.20 for products with reg. pr. < 
€5.00 
€7.63 for pr. w. € 5.00 < reg. pr. < 
€10.00 
€10.29 for products with reg. pr. > 
€10.00 
3 weeks external reference price and 
reputation of seller (quality of the 
good) have positive effect on 
PWYW prices; product value has 
negative effect 
7 Kim, 
Kaufmann 
and 
sandwiches were sold, external 
reference price (i.e., 
information about regular 
EG, LMC €1.19 two days per week 
at lunchtime, for 4 
weeks 
see above 
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 Reference Experimental Design Product Type Payments Duration Main Finding 
Stegemann 
(2014) 
(Field Exp. 
2) 
price) and social distance 
regarding payment (personal 
interaction with waiter or 
anonymity) were varied 
8 Kim, Natter 
and Spann 
(2009) 
buffet lunch 
cinema ticket (regular) 
cinema ticket (discount) 
deli 
EG, LMC €6.44 
€4.87 
€3.11 
€1.94 
2 weeks 
2 days 
1 day 
2 weeks 
 
9 Kim, Natter 
and Spann 
(2014) 
(Exp. 1) 
comparison of free sampling 
and PWYW for Gilette razors; 
participants were surveyed 5 
weeks and 1 year later 
 €1.41 2 days (promotional 
campaign) 
PWYW yields higher repeat 
purchases and is more entertaining 
than free sampling 
10 Kim, Natter 
and Spann 
(2014) 
(Exp. 2) 
comparison of free sampling, 
40% discount and PWYW for 
photo portraits 
LMC PWYW: €16.12 
sampling: €0.00  
discount: €26.00 
3 weeks 
(promotional 
campaign) 
compared to the discount treatment, 
the PWYW treatment attracted 
more buyers and resulted in higher 
revenue 
11 Kunter 
(2015) 
(Study 5) 
potential buyers had to fill out a 
questionnaire before they 
purchased a zoo ticket; 5 
treatments varied textual cues 
in the questionnaire 
EG, LMC control: €5.75 
economic: €5.51  
avoid neg. feelings: €5.69  
pro-social beh.: €5.98 
making excuses: €5.91 
10 days pro-social cues yield sign. higher 
payments than economic cues; 
avoiding feelings of guilt is an 
important factor 
12 Machado 
and Sinha 
(2013) 
(Study 3) 
payments are made after 
playing golf 
EG, LMC PWYW: $22.95 
fixed price: $31.07 
6 Saturdays with PWYW average payments are 
lower, in combination with fixed 
pricing PWYW attracts more 
buyers and increases revenue 
13 Schons et 
al. (2014) 
during the 8 weeks buyers 
made 1-4 purchases of iced 
coffee 
EG first purchase: €0.88-0.99 
second purchase: €0.62-0.88 
third purchase: €0.50-0.76 
8 weeks in aggregate, prices do not decline 
over time but decline on the 
individual level until the 4th 
transaction; buyers have difficulties 
determining seller's cost 
14 Schröder, 
Lüer and 
Sadrieh 
(2015) 
in 2 treatments buyers of soft 
drinks either paid via PWYW 
or reduced a given price by as 
much as they want (mark-of-
your-own price, MOYOP) 
EG PWYW: €0.90 
MOYOP: €0.69 
4 x 40 min. per 
treatment 
prices are significantly lower with 
MOYOP 
DG = digital good, EG = experience good, LMC = good with low marginal cost 
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Table 3: Survey Experiments (SE) 
 Reference Experimental Design Product Type Payment Main Finding 
1 Armstrong and 
Madrigal 
(2014) 
(Study 1) 
subjects are presented with a hypothetical 
online concert ticket purchase scenario; 
treatments differed as to the level of 
external reference prices ($10 or $25) and 
whether they are presented as a 
descriptive norm (“what others have 
paid”) or injunctive norm (“what you 
should pay”) 
EG, LMC 
 
$17.44 low ref. price and descriptive norm 
$25.06 high ref. price and descriptive nom 
$21.21 low ref. price and  injunctive norm 
$36.76 high ref. price and injunctive norm 
in situations without social pressure payments are 
influenced by norms and reference prices; when 
reference prices are high, payments are closer to 
the reference price when the norm is framed as a 
descriptive norm 
. 
2 Armstrong and 
Madrigal 
(2014) 
(Study 2) 
a pretest was used to determine the 
expected price for a concert ticket; 
treatments differed as to the level of 
external reference prices and as to whether 
they are presented as a descriptive or 
injunctive norm 
EG, LMC 
 
reference price = $20 < expected price 
$21.44 descr. / $23.06 inj. 
ref. pr. = $ 45 = expected price 
$ 34.18 descr. / $ 42.09 inj. 
ref. pr. = $70 > expected price 
$ 52.93 descr. / $ 53.59 inj. 
when reference prices are equal to the expected 
price, payments are closer to the reference price 
when the norm is framed as injunctive norm (in 
contrast to the results of study 1) 
3 Hilbert and 
Suessmair 
(2015) 
in a 3 (social interaction: low, medium, 
high) x 3 (norm compliance: low, 
medium, high) factorial design subjects 
indicated their WTP for a travel mug 
low cost €12.80 high social interaction 
€11.92 medium social interaction 
€9.15 low social interaction 
(regular price €17.95) 
with high and medium social interaction subjects’ 
WTP are higher as compared to low social 
interaction; norm compliance is not significant 
4 Jang and Chu 
(2012) 
(Study 1) 
for four products (recording album, 
mobile phone, cake, DVD), 70 subjects 
were asked about their WTP and the 
price they would pay under PWYW 
varying not reported the distribution of the ratio price-paid/WTP is 
similar to the distribution of offer/endowment in 
dictator games 
5 Jang and Chu 
(2012) 
(Study 2a) 
for recording album and mobile phone 
60 subjects were asked about their WTP 
and the price they would pay under 
PWYW; half of the students had 
information about cost 
varying not reported price-paid/WTP ratio is higher in cost provision 
treatment 
6 Jang and Chu 
(2012) 
(Study 2b) 
in a pretest, subjects estimated the cost of 
the mobile phone; average estimated cost 
was $470; in three treatments 120 
students were asked about their WTP and 
the price they would pay under PWYW; 
treatments differed according to 
information about cost ($260, $470, 
$680). Subjects in a control treatment 
received no information 
high cost price-paid/WTP ratios 
40.23% control 
73.18% (cost inf. $260) 
72.00% (cost inf. $470) 
48.48% (cost inf. $680) 
the relation between price-paid and cost 
information is interpreted as buyers signaling 
fairness; buyers pay less if signaling fairness is 
more costly 
 12
 Reference Experimental Design Product Type Payment Main Finding 
7 Jang and Chu 
(2012) 
(Study 3) 
in three treatments subjects were asked 
about their WTP and the price they 
would pay under PWYW for a mobile 
phone; treatment variation with respect 
to information: (i) none, (ii) information 
about cost, $180, (iii)information  about 
cost together with information that most 
subjects would pay nothing 
high cost price-paid/WTP ratios 
40.00% (i) 
60.00% (ii) 
34.00% (iii) 
when injunctive norm (information about cost) 
and descriptive norm (most subjects pay would 
nothing) are in conflict, subjects react stronger to 
the descriptive norm 
8 Jang and Chu 
(2012) 
(Study 4) 
PWYW for Starbucks coffee; treatments 
differed according to the information 
subjects received: (i) fair price is $4.00-
4.50, (ii) fair price is $4.00-4.50 but most 
subjects would pay nothing, (iii) fair 
price is $4.00-4.50 and most subjects 
would pay fair price 
EG, LMC price-paid/WTP ratios 
72.00% (i) 
46.00% (ii) 
70.00% (iii) 
the influence of a injunctive norm (information 
about fair price) is not enhanced by the 
descriptive norm 
9 Johnson and 
Cui (2013) 
(Study 1) 
PWYW for concert tickets in four 
treatments; treatments differed according 
to the information subjects received: (i) 
no reference price, (ii) minimum price = 
$20, (iii) maximum price = $50, (iv) 
suggested price $35 
EG, LMC $45.80 (i) 
$34.45 (ii) 
$29.67 (iii) 
$34.31 (iv) 
reference price has negative effect and reduces 
variance 
10 Johnson and 
Cui (2013) 
(Study 2) 
PWYW for concert tickets in a 2 
(minimum price present or absent) x 2 
(maximum price: present or absent) x 2 
(suggested price: present or absent) 
design 
EG, LMC $43.77 (no information) 
$49.90 (suggested price only) 
$47.00 (minimum price only) 
$35.77 (maximum price only) 
$32.11 (minimum and maximum) 
$42.67 (suggested and minimum) 
$39.53 (suggested and maximum) 
$34.06 (minimum, maximum, suggested) 
external reference prices have negative effect on 
prices paid; if external reference price is provided, 
prices paid are closer to the reference price (less 
variance) 
11 Johnson and 
Cui (2013) 
(Study 3) 
PWYW for concert tickets, in a 2 
(minimum price $10 or $20) x 2 
(maximum price: $50 or $60) x 2 
(suggested price: present or absent) 
design 
EG, LMC $33.04 minimum price = $10 
$38.25 minimum price = $20 
$33.30 maximum price = $50 
$37.99 maximum price = $60 
significant effect of minimum and maximum 
price but no effect of suggested price; the 
extremity of anchors influences buyers’ chosen 
prices 
12 Johnson and 
Cui (2013) 
(Study 4) 
PWYW for concert tickets; in all three 
treatments minimum price = $20 and 
maximum price = $60; treatments 
EG, LMC $32.62 (i) 
$33.58 (ii) 
$37.56 (iii) 
suggested price affects prices buyers actually pay 
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 Reference Experimental Design Product Type Payment Main Finding 
differed according to the suggested price: 
(i) $30, (ii) $40, (iii) $50 
13 Kim, 
Kaufmann and 
Stegemann 
(2014) 
PWYW for several products (cinema 
tickets, DVD, digital album, flight 
tickets, hotel, rental car, opera, wine),  
online survey which varied social 
distance, product value, external 
reference price, seller’s reputation and 
sales promotion; subjects were asked for 
the price they would pay under PWYW, 
their WTP and the regular price 
different subjects paid 65.85% of the regular price 
and 77% of their WTP with respect to all 
products 
PWYW prices increase with lower social 
distance, low value products and external 
reference prices; seller’s reputation and sales 
promotions had no significant effect 
14 Kunter (2015) 
(Study 1) 
 
PWYW for tickets to animal park (sold 
in lecture); real payments but subjects 
received €11.50 show-up fee; study 
explores "motivation-related payment 
factors" 
EG, LMC PWYW prices not reported; 
regular price € 4.00 
 
three most frequent answers: fairness (58%), 
reference prices (46%), customer satisfaction 
(31%) 
15 Kunter (2015) 
(Study 2) 
PWYW for day ticket for wellness and 
sauna, survey and interview with 91 
subjects 
EG, LMC PWYW prices not reported; 
regular price € 20-25 
most frequent answers: reference prices (71%), 
customer satisfaction (47%), fairness (37%) 
16 Kunter (2015) 
(Studies 3 and 
4) 
survey with 153 and 205 subjects; survey 
with paired comparisons took place in 
museum or zoo after subjects purchased 
tickets, in contrast to other surveys prices 
paid are not hypothetical; prices are not 
recorded 
EG, LMC not applicable 
regular prices: 
€4.50 museum 
€14.00 zoo 
most important motives for making positive 
payments: customer satisfaction, fairness, income 
17 Machado and 
Sinha (2013) 
(Study 1)* 
PWYW for dinner in an upscale 
restaurant, in a conjoint analysis, 258 
subjects ranked 12 different profiles; 
profiles differed in characteristics of the 
meal, quality of service, pricing (fixed or 
PWYW) and price paid 
EG, LMC not applicable quality of service and fairness have significant 
effect; reciprocity is not significant; the effect of 
quality of service is largest 
18 Marett, 
Pearson and 
Moore (2012) 
buyers downloaded projects for an app 
(iProduct) from iTunes App Store, made 
their PWYW payments and completed a 
survey 
DG, LMC $0.43 structural equation modeling is used; loyalty 
influences buyers’ WTP; price consciousness and 
usage affect the price actually paid 
19 Santana and 
Morwitz 
PWYW for 16-ounce cup of fresh-
squeezed lemonade, online survey with 
EG, LMC $2.81 (i) 
$1.52 (ii) 
subjects pay more when profits go to charity; 
effect of social norm depends on SVO: with 
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 Reference Experimental Design Product Type Payment Main Finding 
(2013) 
(Study 2)* 
205 M-Turk subjects; social value 
orientation (SVO) was measured and the 
survey primed the norm: (i) communal 
norm in which all profits go to charity, 
and (ii) exchange norm 
exchange norm pro-socials pay more than pro-
selves, with communal norm pro-socials and pro-
selves pay the same 
20 Santana and 
Morwitz 
(2013) 
(Study 3)* 
PWYW for 16-ounce cup of coffee, 
online survey with 546 M-Turk subjects; 
social value orientation (SVO) was 
measured and the survey primed the 
norm: (i) communal relationship norm, 
the description focuses on social aspects 
(e.g., “very warm interaction”), and (ii) 
exchange relationship norm focusing on 
economic aspects 
EG, LMC $2.71 (i) 
$2.22 (ii) 
situational relationship norms leads to higher 
prices, even if profits do not go to charity (cf. 
Study 2); pro-socials ($2.62) pay more than pro-
selves ($2.31) 
21 Santana and 
Morwitz 
(2013) 
(Study 4)* 
PWYW for coffee plus bagel, online 
survey with 339 M-Turk subjects; social 
value orientation (SVO) was measured 
and the survey primed the norm: (i) 
communal norm, and (ii) exchange 
norm; priming took place in an unrelated 
task 
EG, LMC $3.37 (i) 
$3.04 (ii) 
(suggested price $3.00) 
subjects primed with communal norm paid 
significantly more than subjects primed with 
exchange norm; priming effect carries over; pro-
selves react stronger to priming 
22 Thomas and 
Gierl (2014) 
WTP for pizza and hotel room is elicited, 
2 (perspective) × 3 (reference-price 
information) × 3 (profit orientation) 
between subjects × 2 (service category) 
within subjects design 
EG, LMC € 11.03 pizza 
€ 62.13 hotel room 
reference prices (inform. about what others paid 
before or minimum prices) have negative effects, 
no sign. difference between profit and nonprofit 
sellers 
DG = digital good, EG = experience good, LMC = good with low marginal cost 
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Table 4: Case Studies (CS) 
 Reference Description Product Type Payments Duration Main Findings 
1 Krawczyk, 
Kukla-Gryz 
and Tyrowicz* 
(2015) 
PWYW for bundles of about 5 e-books, 
each bundle is sold in a 7 or 14 days 
campaign, the mean price and the eight 
buyers who paid the highest prices are 
listed on the seller’s website 
DG, EG, LMC €5.00 about two years buyers try to match the mean price; due to 
information about payments of others a social norm 
may drive payment behavior 
2 León, Noguera 
and Tena-
Sánchez (2012) 
holiday packages and services (flights, 
hotel stays) of different price categories 
EG, high cost total payment €7,011, 
i.e., 5.1% of total 
value, €137,066 
2 weeks overall very low contributions with 46% of 
customers who paid zero; explanations for low 
payment are a framing effect and a cannibalizing 
effect caused by complementary goods 
 
3 Regner and 
Barria (2009) 
music downloads or CDs are sold, 
buyers can choose any price between $5 
and $18, CD costs additional $4.97 for 
physical costs 
DG, EG, LMC $8.20 
($8.00 recommended 
price) 
18 months 
(September 
2003 – January 
2005) 
on average payments are considerably higher than 
the minimum price of $5 and higher than a 
recommended price of $8; reciprocity as the driver 
for voluntary payments is not confirmed; instead 
warm glow and guilt seem to be motives that drive 
behavior 
4 Regner and 
Riener* (2012) 
 
 
as above, but for two weeks, the seller 
changed its policy so that the artist was 
informed about buyers’ names and 
prices paid; 
DG, EG, LMC $7.99 with anonymity 
$8.05 without 
anonymity 
4 months 
(September — 
December 2005) 
reduced privacy increases payments, but effect is not 
significant; reduced privacy decreases buyers by 
20% per day and decreases revenues by 25% per day 
5 Riener and 
Traxler (2012) 
lunch or dinner at a restaurant EG, LMC €5.26 2 years average payments modestly declined since the start 
of the restaurant but PWYW payments stabilized at 
about 5€ per meal on average; revenues increased 
due to more customers; restaurant has been 
operating for two years in a competitive market with 
PWYW pricing 
6 Santana and 
Morwitz* 
(2013) 
(Study 1) 
adoption fee at animal shelter EG $110.38 
(reference adoption fee 
is $150) 
1 month buyers consider transaction in PWYW as socially 
interdependent; outcomes of sellers are considered; 
communal or exchange norms drive payment 
decisions 
DG = digital good, EG = experience good, LMC = good with low marginal cost 
* Working paper 
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3. Gaps in Current Research 
In this section we address two gaps in the recent studies on PWYW pricing. The first gap is 
that studies are confined to low-price goods and the second one is that studies are confined to 
short-term observations. Both gaps are apparent from the survey above and are related to one 
of the following unanswered questions: (1) What conditions are required so that a seller 
applies PWYW pricing to high-cost goods without making a loss? (2) What are the conditions 
under which sellers can apply PWYW pricing in the long run? 
We think that these questions provide fruitful guidance in research because the answers are of 
central importance for theoretical as well as applied studies on PWYW. On a theoretical level, 
the answers will contribute to the literature on behavioral pricing. On an applied level, the 
answers to question (1) are of interest for sellers who want to use PWYW pricing as a short- 
or long-term strategy, and the answers to question (2) are of interest for sellers who want to 
use PWYW pricing in the long run. 
 
3.1 PWYW and High-Cost Goods 
If we consider the perspective of a seller, PWYW can, firstly, be considered as a marketing 
strategy with the goal of creating awareness for a new product. Long term considerations, 
such as future market penetration, can be reasons for choosing PWYW pricing in the short 
run. Secondly, in the long term, PWYW can be a viable profit-enhancing pricing strategy for 
experience goods with low marginal costs, such as services, music downloads or e-books. 
As a marketing strategy, PWYW can be successful in the short run because it attracts new 
buyers and increases sales. Many buyers might be attracted by the innovative character of 
PWYW pricing (Kim, Natter and Spann 2014), or by the option of making a ‘good’ bargain 
(Shampanier, Mazar and Ariely 2007). Another reason why buyers might be attracted by 
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PWYW pricing is the reduced risk of paying too much for a low quality product. This holds 
especially true for experience goods whose quality is only known after consumption (Nelson 
1970). A buyer, who pays before consumption, is at risk to pay a price she would not pay if 
she knew the quality of the goods in advance. This may lead to abstaining from purchasing 
the good at a fixed price. Egbert, Greiff and Xhangolli (2015) point out that PWYW-ex-post-
consumption can be a viable strategy to reduce information asymmetries and to increase sales. 
This is confirmed in several FE and SE, showing that PWYW payments increase in quality 
(Kim, Kaufmann and Stegemann 2014, Kim, Natter and Spann 2014, Kunter 2015 and Study 
1 in Machado and Sinha 2013). 
Only a small number of studies examine goods which have relatively high cost and which are 
normally sold at higher fixed prices. Exceptions are the sales of holiday packages reported by 
León, Noguera and Tena-Sánchez (2012), with sales between €40 (hotel room for two 
persons, one night) and €2,938 (a seven-night holiday for two persons in Egypt) and the hotel 
stays reported by Gautier and van der Klaauw (2012), with regular sales between €80 and 
€160. 
To see the relation between PWYW pricing and profits, consider the ratio of average PYWW 
payment, ̅, to average cost, ̅,  = ̅
̅
. If r>1, a seller makes positive profits, and if r<1, a 
seller makes a loss. Based on the results summarized in the previous section, it seems that r is 
smaller for goods that have higher costs. 
If applied to goods with a low average cost, PWYW pricing can, in the worst case, lead to 
minimal losses because  ̅is small. For goods with a higher average cost, the risk of making a 
loss is larger, because buyers have a stronger incentive to free-ride by paying a low price. 
Although the empirical results show that buyers are sensitive to reference prices and cost 
information, and that buyers are willing to pay higher prices for goods that come with higher 
costs, it is unclear from the reviewed studies whether sellers can apply PWYW to high-cost 
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goods without making losses. The results from León, Noguera and Tena-Sánchez (2012) and 
Gautier and van der Klaauw (2012) provide a pessimistic outlook, but it appears premature to 
draw any generalized conclusion based on two studies only. Firstly, in both studies, social 
distance between buyers and seller is rather high and this might lead to reduced payments. 
Secondly, it is possible that buyers make small payments because they underestimate 
production costs (Greiff, Egbert and Xhangolli 2014). And, thirdly, buyers might perceive the 
use of PWYW as a marketing campaign in which they are entitled to make payments below 
cost. 
For the FE by Gautier and van der Klaauw (2012), the third explanation seems plausible 
because PWYW was used as part of a promotional campaign. If buyers know that a seller 
does not use PWYW as a short-run marketing strategy, buyers might recognize that the seller 
will stay in business only if payments are high enough, and hence, they might be willing to 
pay higher prices in order to keep the seller in business. 
Although common sense might suggest that PWYW cannot be successful for high cost goods 
because buyers will take advantage of the opportunity to pay low prices, there is no clear 
evidence for this. Many studies on PWYW pricing suggest that positive payments are driven 
by social preferences, in particular by fairness and reciprocity. Results from laboratory 
experiments show that fairness considerations and reciprocity (List and Cherry 2008; Fehr, 
Fischbacher and Tougareva 2002) are not weakened by higher stakes, suggesting that sellers 
do not necessarily make losses when offering high cost products at PWYW pricing. 
 
3.2 PWYW in the Long-Run 
Our survey reveals that most FE rely on data that covers comparatively short periods of time – 
at best several months but mostly only a few days. This is different as with CS. Three CS 
(Krawczyk, Kukla-Gryz and Tyrowicz 2015, Regner and Barria 2009, Riener and Traxler 
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2012) are based on data about PWYW transaction collected over a period of more than a year. 
In these CS, goods with low marginal costs are sold. It is plausible that for these goods 
average payments exceed marginal cost. It seems that for goods with a low marginal cost, 
PWYW can increase profitability by attracting buyers at times when production operates 
below full capacity utilization. With regard to profitability this makes sense if there are 
economies of scale (e.g., due to high fix cost) so that average cost decreases with a higher 
capacity utilization. Digital goods are a specific case because marginal costs are zero and a 
capacity constraint does not exist. For these goods any additional unit sold at an arbitrary 
small but positive price increases profit. 
The above literature survey finds that PWYW can be successfully applied over long periods 
of time if products have low marginal cost, as in the mentioned CS. However, based on our 
survey, it is an open question whether PWYW can be successfully applied over longer periods 
for goods which have positive marginal costs. 
Another important factor which could influence the success of PWYW in the long run is the 
degree of substitutability, which depends on market structure. For instance, if buyers prefer 
the good a seller offers under PWYW and if substitutes are available, buyers have an 
incentive to free-ride under PWYW pricing by buying the good at a low price. The seller 
makes a loss and, eventually, is driven out of business. This is not a problem for buyers 
because substitutes are available. However, if no perfect substitutes are available, the 
incentive to free-ride under PWYW is weaker since driving the seller out of the market cannot 
be in the interest of the buyer. 
An example for this situation can be lunch or dinner at a restaurant. Riener and Traxler find 
that 81% of the customers of the restaurant studied are regular customers who eat there are 
least once a month, and 50% of customers eat there at least twice per month (Riener and 
Traxler 2012, 477). These regular customers might be an important factor driving the success 
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of PWYW at this particular restaurant because they are willing to pay prices that cover costs 
in order to keep the restaurant in business. Arguably, this would be different if there were an 
exact replica of the restaurant which sells at fixed prices (i.e., a restaurant where customers 
could eat exactly the same meals in exactly the same atmosphere). Hence, we postulate that 
over longer time spans, the success of PWYW pricing will depend on the availability of 
substitutes and, therefore, on market structure. This is a hypothesis right now and further 
research into this direction is needed. For example, one could design a LE (similar to Mak et 
al. 2015) in which buyers choose between two goods, one being sold under PWYW pricing 
and the other one being sold under fixed pricing. Across treatments one could vary the degree 
of substitutability between the two goods in order to explore how this affects PWYW 
payments. 
Closely related to the discussion of the long run is the question of how buyers’ payments 
develop over time in repeated purchases. Schons et al. (2013) and Gravert (2014) show that 
prices decrease when purchases are repeated. Decreasing prices do not imply that the seller 
will eventually realize losses. In fact, Riener and Traxler (2012) find that a slow decrease in 
average PWYW payments goes hand in hand with an increase in buyers so that revenue 
increases in total. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we provide a thorough survey of the fast growing literature on PWYW pricing. 
Our survey reviews all empirical studies on PWYW pricing which report data generated in 
laboratory experiments (LE), field experiments (FE), survey experiments (SE) and case 
studies (CS). We find that PWYW pricing is almost exclusively used in very small segments 
of consumer goods, mostly for low-cost goods, experience goods, or for bundles of goods and 
services. Moreover, almost all empirical studies focus on relatively short time periods. 
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Despite the current fashion to investigate PWYW, there are still several unanswered 
questions. In particular, it is not clear if sellers can successfully apply PWYW to high cost 
goods, or over longer time periods. To address these issues, we provided some tentative 
answers in the previous section. However, so far, the amount of goods sold via PWYW 
pricing in comparison to other pricing mechanisms is nothing more than marginal, and further 
research should investigate PWYW pricing in longitudinal studies in order to identify 
opportunities for sellers. 
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